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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 970426-CA

:

MARK ANDERSON,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction on 14 counts
of fraudulently obtaining controlled substances by prescription,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp.
1993), in the First Judicial District Court, Cache County, the
Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction

under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (Supp. 1997).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Does a statute providing that a physician "cannot, without

the consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action/' apply
in a criminal action?
A trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of
law and thus reviewed for correctness.
1355, 1357 (Utah 1993).

State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d

2.

Where a person consults physicians for the purpose of

fraudulently obtaining controlled substances, are his communications
protected by rule 506, Utah Rules of Evidence?
"The existence of a privilege is a question of law for the court,
which [this Court will] review for correctness, giving no deference
to the trial court's determination." Price v. Armour, 949 P. 2d 1251,
1254 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc.,
842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992)).
3.

Assuming arguendo that the physician-patient privilege

otherwise applies, may defendant assert that privilege at trial after
having waived it by not objecting to the doctors' testimony in the
preliminary hearing?
See standard of review for issue No. 2.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following provisions are reproduced in addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code Ann. § 58-17a-604 (4) (b) (Supp. 1996);
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3) (Supp. 1993);
Code Ann. § 78-24-8 (1995);
R. Evid. 506;
R. Evid. 507.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant was charged by Amended Information with 20 counts
of fraudulently obtaining controlled substances by prescription (R.
a-j).

At the conclusion of a two-day trial, the jury convicted

defendant on 14 counts and acquitted defendant on six counts (R.

2

68-71, 108-14).

Defendant was sentenced to statutory terms, but

his sentences were stayed and defendant was placed on probation (see
unpaginated Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment).

Defendant timely

appealed (R. 120-21) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Motion in Limine
Defendant filed a Motion in Limine Respecting Physician-Patient
Privilege (R. 46) . The motion sought an "Order limiting the Plaintiff
in the presentation of evidence as to testimony by defendant's
treating physicians and respecting the records of said treating
physician with respect to communications between Defendant and
Defendant's treating physicians and impressions gained by Defendant's
treating physician in the course of said treatment" (R. 46) . The
trial court denied defendant's motion in limine to suppress under
the physician-patient privilege (R. 150-51).
At the hearing on this motion, the court noted that the statutory
privilege found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 (1995) was expressly
limited to civil actions (R. 150-51) . With respect to the equivalent
court rule, rule 506, Utah Rules of Evidence, the court reasoned
that while the rule is not expressly limited to civil actions,
applying it in the present context would be inconsistent with Utah

1

Except as noted, facts are stated in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1205-06 (Utah 1993); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah
1989).
3

Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1993), which criminalizes the obtaining
of controlled substances by misrepresentation or non-disclosure (R.
151).
The court denied defendant's motion and ruled that the State
could examine the physicians limited to the areas identified in the
prosecutor's memorandum (R. 151, 55-60) . This ruling permitted the
State to ask the physicians questions such as whether they had
prescribed a controlled substance to defendant, whether defendant
had disclosed that his primary care physician had already issued
a prescription, and whether this information would have caused the
physician not to issue the prescription, and "logical extensions"
of such questions

(R. 57, 115, 151-52).

Defendant's motion was

granted as to "all other material" (R. 152).
Trial facts
Defendant was treated by his primary care physician, Dr. Lars
Bergeson of Logan, Utah, during the period October 1992 through
November

1994;

Dr.

Bergeson

prescribed

Tussionex,

a

cough

suppressant, and Lortab, a pain reliever (R. 217-26, 236-41) . Both
are synthetic narcotics (R. 222-25).

He also refilled defendant's

prescription for Bantus, another narcotic cough medication (R. 229) .2
Drs. Cory Johnson, Russell Anderson, Douglas Hyldahl, Bruce
Isaacson, and Glen Mortensen all testified that, during the same

2

None of the charges are based on medications prescribed by
Dr. Bergeson (R. 224) .
4

period, they all prescribed Tussionex and other controlled substances
containing the narcotics hydrocodone or codeine to defendant; that
defendant did not inform them that he was receiving the same
controlled substances from another source; and that they would not
have issued the prescriptions had defendant disclosed this information
(see R. 245-93, State's exhibits 8-17). 3
Records from Payless Pharmacy, Shopko Pharmacy, Wal-Mart Pharmacy,
Fred Meyer Pharmacy, Reed's Pharmacy, Spence's North Pharmacy, and
Spence's South Pharmacy established that the narcotic medications
were dispensed to defendant—the equivalent of more than 50 four-ounce
bottles over 11 months (see R. 313-43, 377; State's exhibits 18-24) .
When questioning exceeded the limits of the court's order,
defendant's objections were sustained (see, e.g., R. 227-28, 231-32,
241, 259).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the physician-patient
privilege is a relatively recent innovation.

Most legal scholars

condemn it and those states which recognize it tend to limit its
scope. Defendant here is not entitled to the protections of Utah's
physician-patient

privilege to shield himself

from charges of

fraudulently obtaining controlled substances by prescription.

3

Portions of medical records relating to defendant's
symptoms or any diagnosis were masked prior to trial, leaving
visible only his name, certain dates, and prescription notations
(see State's exhibits 5-24).
5

1. The trial court correctly ruled that admission of the doctors'
testimony against defendant did not violate the physician-patient
privilege as codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 (1995) . Defendant's
claim fails because the Utah Supreme Court has held that this statute
does not apply in criminal cases.
2. a. Defendant's claim that admission of the doctors' testimony
violated the physician-patient privilege found in rule 506(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence, must also fail. By its own terms, the physicianpatient privilege protects only information communicated for the
purpose

of diagnosing

or treating

the patient.

Accordingly,

communications between a patient and physician having a criminal
purpose are not protected by the privilege.

Defendant's purpose

in consulting the doctors was to fraudulently obtain prescriptions
for controlled substances, not to seek treatment; therefore, the
trial

court

correctly

refused

to

apply

the

physician-patient

privilege.
b.

Defendant's claim that admission of the doctors' testimony

violated the physician-patient privilege as codified in rule 506
fails for a second reason.

The trial court correctly held that

applying rule 506(b) would be inconsistent with Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8 (Supp. 1993) , which criminalizes the obtaining of controlled
substances by misrepresentation or non-disclosure.

Allowing the

defendant to invoke the physician-patient privilege against a charge

6

of prescription fraud would make this crime impossible to prosecute.
Therefore, the trial court correctly refused to apply the privilege.
3.

Assuming arguendo the physician-patient privilege had

application to this case, defendant waived the privilege by failing
to assert it when the physicians testified in the preliminary hearing.
Failure to object on privilege grounds constitutes waiver of the
privilege. Furthermore, courts generally hold that once the privilege
is waived it cannot be reasserted. Accordingly, defendant's failure
to assert the privilege when the physicians

testified at the

preliminary hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege, which
cannot be reasserted at trial.
ARGUMENT
Introduction
"For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as
a fundamental maxim that the public . . . has a right to every man' s
evidence." Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (1996) (quoting
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).

Exceptions to

this principle "are not lightly created nor expansively construed,
for they are in derogation of the search for truth." United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
"Testimonial privileges are permitted only to the very limited
extent that excluding relevant evidence 'has public good transcending
the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means
for ascertaining truth.'" In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1193 (2nd Cir.
7

1983) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, which dates from the reign
of Elizabeth I, no physician-patient privilege existed at common
law; it is a "purely statutory innovation."

8 J. Wigmore, Wigmore

on Evidence § 2286, at 528, § 2290 at 542, § 2380 at 818-19
(McNaughten rev. 1961); 2 Jack b. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger,
Weinstein's Evidence, 5 504[01] at 504-9 (1994).
"Legal

scholars

have

condemnation of it." Id.

been

virtually

unanimous

in

their

See, e.g. , 8 Wigmore § 2380a at 831 ("It

is certain that the practical employment of the privilege has come
to mean little but the suppression of useful truth"); McCormick' s
Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 105 at 228 (Edward W. Cleary, ed.,
1972) ("More than a century of experience with the statutes has
demonstrated that the privilege in the main operates not as the shield
of privacy but as the protector of fraud").
"[I]n recognition of the privilege's undesirable effects," states
which have adopted a general medical privilege "have whittled away
at the privilege so that its scope has been considerably reduced."
2 Weinstein fl 504[1] at 504-10.
No federal physician-patient privilege exists, although the
United States Supreme Court recently adopted a psychotherapist-patient
privilege.

See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931.

In justifying this

privilege, the Court noted that psychotherapy requires disclosure
8

of "facts, emotions, memories, and fears." Id. at 1928. In contrast,
"[t]reatment by a physician for physical ailments can often proceed
successfully on the basis of a physical examination, objective
information supplied by the patient, and the results of diagnostic
tests."

Id.

Both the Utah Code and the Utah Rules of Evidence recognize
the physician-patient privilege. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 (4)
(1995); Utah R. Evid. 506.

Defendant relies on both.
POINT I

BY ITS PLAIN LANGUAGE, THE STATUTORY PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE IS LIMITED TO CIVIL ACTIONS
Defendant claims that admission of the doctors' testimony violated
the physician-patient privilege as codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-248 (1995) .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 (4) (1995) provides in pertinent part
(emphasis added) : "A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent
of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information
acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to enable him
to prescribe or act for the patient."
Defendant's contention fails because the Utah Supreme Court
has held that this statute does not apply in criminal cases. State
v. Dean, 69 Utah 268, 272-73, 254 P. 142, 143 (Utah 1927); see Br.
Aplt. at 11. Indeed, given the statute's plain language, a court
could hardly conclude otherwise. See OfKeefe v. Utah State Retirement

9

Bd. , 929 P. 2d 1112, 1115 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ; Stephens v. Bonneville
Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997).
Defendant asserts that section 78-24-8 "should be construed
liberally to afford defendant due process; the distinction made by
the legislature is invidious and has no rational basis." Br. Aplt.
at 7. Because this assertion is supported by neither authority nor
analysis, it must be rejected.

See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,

966 (Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984);
State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l

(Utah App. 1996); State v.

Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097, 1100 n.3 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied,
913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 n.3
(Utah App. 1994); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
POINT II
WHERE A PERSON CONSULTS PHYSICIANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF
FRAUDULENTLY
OBTAINING
CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES,
HIS
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THOSE PHYSICIANS ARE NOT PROTECTED BY
RULE 506, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Defendant claims that admission of the doctors' testimony violated
the physician-patient privilege found in rule 506(b), Utah Rules
of Evidence.

Br. Aplt. at 7.

Rule 506 reads in pertinent part:
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information
is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of
diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a
privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose
and to prevent any other person from disclosing (1)
diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by
a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information
obtained by examination of the patient, and (3) information
10

transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health
therapist, and persons who are participating in the
diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician
or mental health therapist . . .
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to
a communication relevant to an issue of the physical,
mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any
claim or defense, . . .
A.

Defendant is not entitled to the protection of the
rule because the purpose of his visits was not to seek
treatment, but to fraudulently obtain drugs.

The scope of a privilege "is limited by its underlying purpose."
State v. Forshee, 611 P.2d

1222, 1224

(Utah 1980)

(construing

forerunner of Utah R. Evid. 505, Government informer privilege).
By its own terms, the physician-patient privilege protects only
information communicated "for the purpose of diagnosing or treating
the patient." Utah R. Evid. 506(b) . It follows that the privilege
may not be claimed by a person who consults a physician for a purpose
other than diagnosis or treatment.

Moutzoukos v. Mutual Benefit

Health & Accident Ass'n, 69 Utah 309, 318, 254 P. 1005 (Utah 1927)
(error to exclude information obtained by physician in employerrequired pre-employment examination).
This reasoning applies with particular force if the purpose
of the "patient" was criminal.

"Communications between a patient

and a physician having for their object the commission of a crime
are not within the physician-patient privilege." 81 Am. Jur. Witnesses

11

§ 482 (1992) . "If the patient's purpose in the consultation is an
unlawful one, as . . . to obtain narcotics in violation of law, .
. . the law withholds the shield of privilege." McCormick' s Handbook
of the Law of Evidence § 99 at 215 (Edward W. Cleary, ed., 1972).
See

also

3

Jones

on

Evidence

(6th

ed.)

§

21.29

at

823

(" [c] ommunications between physician and patient, however confidential
they may be, are held not to be privileged if they have been made
in the furtherance of an unlawful or criminal purpose") . "In such
cases [the physician-patient privilege] has no public policy or social
value."

Green v. State, 274 N.E.2d 267, 273 (Ind. 1971).

In keeping with the foregoing principles, courts generally refuse
to allow the privilege to be invoked by those accused of obtaining
drugs by manipulating their doctors. For example, State v. Garrett,
456 N.E.2d 1319, 1320

(Ohio App. 1983), involved a patient who

obtained a prescription for sleeping pills, then two days later
obtained a second prescription by falsely claiming that the first
prescription had been stolen.

The physician testified that if he

had known that the first prescription had not in fact been stolen,
he would not have written the second.

Id.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that defendant sought
the services of his doctor, "not as a result of a disease or disorder
suffered by defendant, but, rather, for the obtaining of an illegal
drug by the use of false statements to the physician." Id. at 1319.
Thus, it held, the statutory physician-patient privilege "does not
12

make inadmissible the testimony of a physician regarding false
statements made to said physician by a person seeking a prescription
for an illegal drug where there is no evidence that the drug was
obtained by said person for the treatment of any medical illness,
disease or disorder."

Id. at 1322.

To the same effect is State v. Thomale, 317 N.W.2d 147 (S.D.
1982) . There, the defendant claimed he had lost his medication and
requested his doctor to write a prescription for the medication.
Id. at 148. The court affirmed, stating, "Since the statements made
by defendant to [the doctor] were made for the purpose of obtaining
possession of controlled substances rather than to cure or alleviate
an illness, the conversation was not privileged . . ." Ld. See also
Finney v. State, 623 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Ark. App. 1981) (physicianpatient privilege does not bar doctor's testimony in trial on
prescription forgery charge); Sharp v. State, 569 N.E.2d 962, 965
(Ind. App. 1991) ("We hold that when . . . the patient on whose behalf
a prescription is written is a defendant in a criminal prosecution
involving the prescription, the prescription is not privileged");
but see People v. Sinski, 669 N.E.2d 809(N.Y. 1996).
These principles apply here.

Although all six doctors did

diagnose and treat defendant (who was in fact ill), nevertheless,
his purpose in consulting them was to fraudulently obtain controlled
substances. Any one of the six might have legitimately prescribed
a single narcotic and, in fact, defendant was not charged in
13

connection with Dr. Bergeson's initial prescriptions (R. 232-33).
Defendant's purpose in consulting multiple doctors was criminal,
not medical.
The policy of the physician-patient privilege is to "encourage
and permit the patient freely to impart to the doctor any information
which

is necessary,

or will be helpful, to the physician

prescribing or acting for the patient."

in

Clawson v. Walgreen Drug

Co., 162 P.2d 759, 770 (Utah 1945) (Larson, C.J., concurring and
dissenting) . To permit defendant, under the cloak of the privilege,
to affirmatively mislead physicians would offend both the policy
of the privilege and the language of rule 506(b) . For this reason,
his rule 506 claim should be rejected.
B.

Defendant' s broad reading of rule 506 would effectively
nullify the prescription fraud statute.

Defendant's rule 506 claim fails for a second reason. The trial
court ruled that applying rule 506(b) in the context of this case
would be inconsistent with Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1993),
which

criminalizes

the

obtaining

of

controlled

substances

by

misrepresentation or non-disclosure (R. 151). The court was correct:
permitting a defendant to invoke the physician-patient privilege
against a charge of prescription fraud would render the crime
impossible to prosecute. In effect, the court ruled that defendant's
statements to the doctors proved "an element of any claim or defense,"
and thus fell within the rule' s exception. See Utah R. Evid. 506 (d) .

14

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3) (a) (ii) (Supp. 1993) reads in pertinent
part: "It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
. . . to obtain a prescription for . . . any controlled substance
by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source . . ."
This

statute

does

not

criminalize

obtaining

multiple

prescriptions, but obtaining any prescription by misrepresentation
or fraudulent non-disclosure.

Therefore, the prosecution cannot

establish its case through pharmaceutical records alone; the doctor
must testify to the patient's fraudulent communications.

To hold

the physician-patient privilege applicable in such cases would
effectively grant immunity to all perpetrators of this crime.
The Michigan Court of Appeals drew a similar conclusion in People
v. Johnson, 314 N.W.2d 631 (Mich. App. 1981) . Suffering from acute
bronchitis, defendant consulted his physician, who prescribed fifteen
tablets of pentazocine, a controlled substance. Jd. at 632. However,
before filling the prescription, defendant altered the prescription,
changing the "15" to a "45."

Jd.

a

misrepresentation,

controlled

substance

deception, or subterfuge.

by

He was prosecuted for obtaining
fraud,

forgery,

Id.

The court of appeals ruled the physician-patient privilege was
not available on these facts.

"The prescription could only be

verified by the physician who issued it.
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Without the doctor's

testimony, convictions for forgeries of prescriptions would be wellnigh impossible."

Id. at 634.

"Like statutes, court rules are construed to avoid absurd
results."

State v. Kelly, 808 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Wash. App. 1991).

They should also be construed "to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Utah R. Evid. 102.
Construing the physician-patient privilege in a manner to effectively
nullify a substantive criminal statute would not serve these ends.
The trial court correctly refused to do so here.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE DOCTORS' TESTIMONY
AT HIS PRELIMINARY HEARING WAIVED ANY OTHERWISE APPLICABLE
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE AT TRIAL
Assuming arguendo that the physician-patient privilege applied
here, defendant waived the privilege by failing to assert it when
the doctors testified in his preliminary hearing.
In opposing defendant's motion to suppress
prosecutor

argued

that

defendant

had

at trial, the

already

waived

any

physician/patient privilege by not objecting when his physicians
testified in the preliminary hearing: "once waived, always waived"
(R. 146-48) . Defense counsel argued that he had objected, but that
his objection had been overruled (R. 147) . The prosecutor did not
recall that an objection based on privilege had been lodged (R. 147) .
The trial court rejected the State's argument, ruling that nonobjection at the preliminary constituted waiver "as far as that
16

hearing was concerned, but would not be effective at subsequent
hearings'7 (R. 150). However, it added, "If I'm wrong on that I'd
like an appellate court to so advise me" (id. ) . The trial was in
fact wrong on this point.
At the preliminary hearing, Drs. Russell Anderson, Cory Johnson,
Bruce Isaacson, Glenn Mortensen, Douglas Hyldahl, and Lars Bergeson
all testified without objection on the ground of physician-patient
privilege

(see R. 403: 6-83).

These are the same doctors who

testified at trial (see R. 216-93).
The physician-patient privilege may of course be waived. Clawson
v. Walgreen Drug Co. , 162 P.2d 759,763 (Utah 1945) . Failure to object
to evidence on privilege grounds constitutes waiver of the privilege.
See State v. Scott, 491S.W.2d514, 519 (Mo. 197 3) (en banc) ; Hughson
v. St. Francis Hoso. of Port Jervis, 463 N.Y.S.2d 224, 230 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. App. 1983); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 140 (Wyo. 1986);
McCormick § 102; 81 Am.Jur. Witnesses § 511 (1992).
Furthermore, courts generally hold that "once waived, whether
at a former trial or otherwise, a patient cannot reassert his or
her privilege."

State v. Mincev, 687 P.2d 1180, 1194 (Az.), cert,

denied, 469 U.S. 1040 (1984) ; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d
804, 805 (3d Cir. 1979); Novak v. Rathnam, 478 N.E.2d 1334, 1337
(111. 1985); Hamilton v. Verdow, 414 A.2d 914, 919 (Md. App. 1980);
State v. Bishop, 453 A.2d 1365, 1368 (N.J. App. 1982) ; State v. Smith,
929 P.2d 1191, 1197 (Wash App. 1997); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 662
17

A.2d 610, 614-15 (1995), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1053 (1996); but
see Johnson, 314 N.W.2d at 633.
Thus Wigmore writes that "the original disclosure [of privileged
information] takes away once and for all the confidentiality sought
to be protected by the privilege.

To enforce it thereafter is to

seek to preserve a privacy which exists in legal fiction only."
8 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2389, at 860-61 (McNaughten rev.
1961) (emphasis omitted).
Similarly, a popular dictum observes that "when a secret is
out, it is out for all time, and cannot be caught again like a bird,
and put back in its cage." People v. Al-Kanani, 307 N.E.2d 43 (N.Y.
1973) (citations omitted) , cert, denied, 417 U.S. 916 (1974). Thus,
to resuscitate the privilege after its waiver "would simply be an
obstruction to public justice."

Id.

Accordingly, defendant's failure to assert the privilege when
the doctors testified at his preliminary hearing constituted a waiver
as to trial as well.

The trial judge's ruling on this point was

mistaken and this Court may, in his words, "so advise [him]" (R.
150) by affirming on this alternative ground.

See State v. South,

924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996).
CONCLUSION
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
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ADDENDUM

Relevant statutes and rules

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

53-17a-604. Medication profiles.
(1) (a) Each pharmacy shall establish a medication profile
system for pharmacy patients according to sta.nda.rcis
established by division rules made in collaboration with
the board.
(b) The rules shall indicate the method for recording ail
prescription information.
(2) The pharmacy shall maintain the medication profile for
any pharmacy patient who expresses a desire for that professional service.
(3) The pharmacy may charge an appropriate professional
fee for this service and for copying or providing information in
me medication profile to another authorized person.
(4) A pharmacist, pharmacy intern, or pharmacy technician
may ^oi release or discuss the information contained in a
prescription or patient's medication profile to anyone except:
(a) the pharmacy patient in person or the pharmacy
patient's legal guardian or designee; (b) a lawfiiily authorized federal, state, or local drug
enforcement officer;
(c) a third party payment program administered under
terms authorized by the pharmacy patient;
(d) a pharmacist, pharmacy intern!, or pharmacy technician providing pharmacy services to the patient or a
prescribing practitioner providing professional- services to
the patient;
(e) another pharmacist, pharmacy intern, pharmacy
technician, or prescribing practitioner to whom the padent has requested a prescription transfer; or
(f) the pharmacy patient's attorney, after the presentation of a written authorization signed by the:
(i) patient, before a notary public;
(ii) parent or lawful guardian, if the patient is a
minor;
(iii) lawful guardian,.if the patient is fncompetent;
or
(iv) personal representative, if the patient is deceased.
1396

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed
practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute.
D) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this

chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not
concealedfromthose present; however, a person may not be convicted
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so;
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child* as defined in Section
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring the
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain
or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the
purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of
a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXi) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(aXi) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.

(0 Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(aXii) through
(2)(aXvii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a
controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person
not authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or famish any record, notification, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under
this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by
this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be punished
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or
indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of. to procure or atfpmpt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter,
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription,
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,

trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (5)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where
the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less thanfiveyears if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been
served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.

(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation ofthis section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law,
(b) Where violation ofthis chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if
there is compliance with Subsection (9Xb), impose a minimum term to be
served by the defendant, of up to V2 the maximum sentence imposed by law
for the offense committed.
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as
provided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial,
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is
otherwise recognized as admissible by law.
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substantive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under
Subsection (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the
defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court,
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion
determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9)(b).

(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections
76-8-1001 «**! 76-8-1002.
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the
substance or substances.
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his profesisional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act wno
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
78-24-8. Privileged communications.
There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the
law to encourage conndence and to preserve it inviolate.
Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a witness in the
following cases:
(1) (a) Neither a wife nor a husband may either during
the marriage or afterwards be, without the consent of
the other, examined as to any communication made
by one to the other during the marriage.
(b) This exception does not apply:
(i) to a civil action or proceeding by one spouse
against the other;
(ii) to a criminal action or proceeding for a
crime committed by one spouse against the other;
(iii) to the crime of deserting or neglecting to
support a spouse or child;
(iv) to any civil or criminal proceeding for
abuse or neglect committed against the child of
either spouse; or
(v) if otherwise specifically provided by law.
(2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his
client, be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him or bis advice given regarding the communication in the course of his professional employment. An
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk cannot be
examined, without the consent of his employer, concerning any fact, the knowledge of which Ha* been acquired in
his capacity as an employee.
(3) A clergyman or priest rannot, without the consent of
the person making the confession, be examined as to any
confession made to him in his professional character in
the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he
belongs.
(4) A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent
of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any
information acquired in attending the patient which was
necessary *o enable him to prescribe or act for the patient.
However, this privilege shall be deemed to be waived by
the patient in an action in which the patient places his
medical condition at issue as an element or factor of his
claim or defense. Under those circumstances, a physician
or surgeon who has prescribed for or treated that patient
for the medical condition at issue may provide information, interviews, reports, records, statements, memoranda, or other data relating to the patient's medical
condition and treatment which are placed at issue.
(5) A public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to Him in official confidence when the public
interests would suifer by the disclosure.
(6) A sexual assault counselor as denned in Section
78-3c-3 cannot, without the consent of the victim, be
examined in a civil or criminal proceeding as to any
confidential communication as defined in Section 78-3c-3
made by the victim.
i«o

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 506. Physician and mental health therapist-patient.
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) ^Patient" means a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by
a physician or mental health therapist.
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably believed by the
patient to be licensed, to practice medicine in amy state.
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or is reasonably
believed by the patient to be licensed or certified in any state as a physician,
psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family therapist,
advanced practice registered nurse designated as a registered psychiatric
mental health nurse specialist, or professional counselor while that person is
engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition,
including alcohol or drug addition.
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has
a privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any
other person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice
given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by
examination of the patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient,
a physician or mental health therapist, and persons who are participating in
the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or mental
health therapist, including guardians or members of the patient's family who
are present to further the interest of the patient because they are reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the communications, or participation in the
diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health
therapist.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
patient, or the guardian or conservator of the patient. The person who was the
physician or mental health therapist at the time of the communication is
presumed to have authority during the life of the patient to claim the privilege
on behalf of the patient.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a communication relevant
to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense, or,
after the patient's death, in amy proceedings in which any party relies upon the
condition as an element of the claim or defense;
(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For communications relevant to an
issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the mental
health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that
the patient is in need of hospitalization;
(3) Court ordered examination. For communications made in the course of,
and pertinent to the purpose of, a court-ordered examination of the physical,
mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or witness, unless
the court in ordering the examination specifies otherwise.
(Amended effective July 1, 1994.)

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 507, Miscellaneous matters.
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of
the confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person or
a predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to
the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication, or fails
to take reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure. This rule does
not apply if the disclosure is itself a privileged communication*
(b) Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not
admissible against the holder of the privilege if disclosure was
(1) compelled erroneously or
(2) made without opportunity to claim the privilege.
(c)(1) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of privilege, whether
in the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of
comment by judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom.
(2) Claiming privilege without knowledge of jury. Injury cases, proceedings
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of
claims of privilege without the knowledge of the jury.
(3) Jury instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might
draw an adverse inference from the claim of privilege is entitled to instruction
that no inference may be drawn therefrom.
(4) Exception. In a civil action, the provisions of subparagraph (c) do not
apply when the privilege against self-incrimination has been invoked.

